When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware for SECRET or TOP SECRET computing environments, the physical server and all computing environments are of the same classification and belong to the same security domain.
Topic
Functional separation between computing environments
Applicable to
Secret, Top Secret
History
Priority
must
Mar 2022
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware for SECRET or TOP SECRET computing environments, the physical server and all computing environments are of the same classification and belong to the same security domain.
Miscellaneous changes were made to rationale and recommendations throughout the publication to clarify content without changing intent. This included a review from the Guidelines for System Hardening chapter through to the Guidelines for Data Transfers chapter.
Dec 2021
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware for SECRET or TOP SECRET workloads, the physical server and all computing environments running on the physical server are of the same classification and within the same security domain.
Miscellaneous changes were made to rationale and security controls throughout the publication. This included:
• A review from the Using the Information Security Manual chapter through to the Guidelines for Media chapter.
• Security controls suitable for all audiences have been identified with the ‘All’ applicability marking while additional security controls suitable for just government audiences have been identified with the O, P, S and TS applicability markings.
• Security controls suitable for specific classifications have been amended to include their classification(s) in the wording of the security controls to reduce the reliance on applicability markings to confer suitability.
• Tables in security controls have been converted into prose to allow for inclusion in the SSP annex template and the XML list of security controls.
• The use of ‘official’ and ‘highly classified’ terminology has been replaced with specific classifications to remove ambiguity.
• Security controls relating to high assurance ICT equipment have had their applicability narrowed to ‘S, TS’ reflecting that they are intended for the protection of SECRET and TOP SECRET systems and data.
Jan 2021
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware, the physical server and all computing environments running on the physical server are of the same classification and within the same security domain.
Security control 1461 was modified to remove a conflict with security control 1529.
Dec 2020
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware, the physical server and all computing environments running on the physical server are controlled by the same organisation, are of the same classification and are within the same security domain.
Jul 2019
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware, the physical server and all computing environments running on the physical server are controlled by the same organisation, are of the same classification and are within the same security domain.
Security control 1461 was modified to incorporate guidance from security controls 1462 and 1463 from the November 2018 release of the ISM.
Jun 2019
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware, the physical server and all computing environments running on the physical server are of the same classification.
2015
When using a software-based isolation mechanism to share a physical server’s hardware,agencies must control all of the computing environments running on the physical server.