Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically: • their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks • costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks • availability monitoring and thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks • thresholds for turning off any online services or functionality during denial-of-service attacks • pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks • any arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious network traffic as far upstream as possible.
Topic
Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies
Applicable to
all
History
Priority
should
Jun 2023
Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks
• availability monitoring and thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for turning off any online services or functionality during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• any arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious network traffic as far upstream as possible.
The existing control relating to performing availability monitoring to detect denial-of-service attacks was rescinded due to overlap with control ISM-1431 that recommends denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies be discussed with cloud service providers (including availability monitoring and thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks). [ISM-1435]
Jun 2023
Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks
• availability monitoring and thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for turning off any online services or functionality during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• any arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious network traffic as far upstream as possible.
The existing control relating to determining what functionality and quality of online services can be lived without during a denial-of-service attack was rescinded due to its overlap with control ISM-1431 that calls for denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies to be discussed with cloud service providers (including thresholds for turning off any online services or functionality, and other pre-approved actions that can be taken, during a denial-of-service attack).
Mar 2022
Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• any costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for turning off online services during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• any arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious network traffic as far upstream as possible.
Miscellaneous changes were made to rationale and recommendations throughout the publication to clarify content without changing intent. This included a review from the Guidelines for System Hardening chapter through to the Guidelines for Data Transfers chapter.
Dec 2021
Denial-of-service attack prevention and mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• any costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for turning off online services during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• denial-of-service attack prevention arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious traffic as far upstream as possible.
Miscellaneous changes were made to rationale and security controls throughout the publication. This included:
• A review from the Using the Information Security Manual chapter through to the Guidelines for Media chapter.
• Security controls suitable for all audiences have been identified with the ‘All’ applicability marking while additional security controls suitable for just government audiences have been identified with the O, P, S and TS applicability markings.
• Security controls suitable for specific classifications have been amended to include their classification(s) in the wording of the security controls to reduce the reliance on applicability markings to confer suitability.
• Tables in security controls have been converted into prose to allow for inclusion in the SSP annex template and the XML list of security controls.
• The use of ‘official’ and ‘highly classified’ terminology has been replaced with specific classifications to remove ambiguity.
• Security controls relating to high assurance ICT equipment have had their applicability narrowed to ‘S, TS’ reflecting that they are intended for the protection of SECRET and TOP SECRET systems and data.
Jul 2020
Denial-of-service attack prevention and mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• any costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for turning off online services during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• denial-of-service attack prevention arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious traffic as far upstream as possible.
Security control 1431 was amended slightly.
Jun 2020
Denial-of-service attack prevention and mitigation strategies are discussed with service providers, specifically:
• their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks
• any costs likely to be incurred by customers resulting from denial-of-service attacks
• thresholds for notifying customers or turning off their online services during denial-of-service attacks
• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks
• denial-of-service attack prevention arrangements with upstream providers to block malicious traffic as far upstream as possible.
2015
Agencies should discuss denial of service prevention and mitigation strategies with serviceproviders, specifically:• their capacity to withstand a denial of service• any costs likely to be incurred by customers resulting from a denial of service• thresholds for notifying customers or turning off their online services during a denial ofservice• pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during a denial of service.